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Abstract 
I argue that advocates of moderate epistemic idealization need some standards against which they 
can determine whether a particular individual P has a responsibility to acquire some specific piece 
of information α. Such a specification is necessary for the purpose of determining whether a reason 
R, the recognition of which depends on accounting for α, can legitimately be ascribed to P. To this 
end, I propose an initial sketch of a criterion that may be helpful in illuminating the conditions in 
which P might be said to have a responsibility to take α into account when searching for reasons to 
act or believe. I worry that reason ascriptions that are based on information acquisition expectations 
which are not captured by this criterion (and, hence, not legitimate reason ascriptions) may be open 
to charges of authoritarianism, especially when such a reason ascription prompts one person to 
demand that another act in a way that is responsive to the ascribed reason(s). 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
It is a common practice in moral and political life to ascribe a reason to an individual (whether 
implicitly or explicitly) and then proceed to treat that individual as if he or she in fact has the 
ascribed reason. This happens in a wide range of cases, from everyday cases of social morality, 
where one person demands that another act in a certain way, to debates in political philosophy 
(e.g., debates about the public justification of political power). It is often argued, though 
sometimes simply assumed, that the ascribing party is justified in attributing one or more reasons 
to the individual in question – even if that individual does not recognize or endorse those 
reasons. One well-trodden way to justify such an ascription of reasons is to appeal to the notion 
of idealization. To engage in idealization (specifically, epistemic idealization) is to consider how 
a person would act if that person were deliberating under ideal circumstances.
1
 Such 
circumstances are usually taken to entail proper reasoning and the possession of adequate 
                                                     
1
 I use the term “act” in its broadest sense. I take it to include non-physical acts such as changing what one believes 
or values. 
2 
 
information. As such, epistemic idealization has both a rationality component and an information 
component.
2
 
 We can distinguish generally between accounts of full idealization and accounts of 
moderate idealization. Full idealization entails construing idealized agents as flawless 
deliberators and as possessors of perfect information. Moderate idealization entails construing 
idealized agents as less than fully idealized. My purpose in this paper is to articulate a problem 
which confronts any account of moderate idealization that permits idealization with respect to 
the information component.
3
 The specific problem that concerns me is this: advocates of 
moderate idealization need some standards against which they can determine whether a 
particular individual P has a responsibility to acquire some specific piece of information α. Such 
a specification is necessary for the purpose of determining whether a reason R, the recognition of 
which depends on accounting for α, can legitimately be ascribed to P. As I shall argue, the 
practice of ascribing reasons to agents is a practice that often involves the importing of 
unwarranted expectations regarding the information acquisition responsibilities of those agents. 
                                                     
2
 This point is nicely expressed by Kevin Vallier in his discussion of what he calls the “standard conception of 
idealization” (2014, p. 145). 
3
 I acknowledge that an account of moderate idealization might significantly restrain what it means to idealize the 
information component. For example, one might argue that the information that one obtains by merely deliberating 
or drawing inferences from one’s existing information base counts as new information. Such information is just a 
by-product of further “internal” deliberation. That is, such idealization of the information component is just a by-
product of idealization of the rationality component. However, when I speak of moderate idealization throughout 
this paper, I have in mind only those accounts which permit the idealization of an agent’s knowledge base through 
supplementation of information which is “external” to the agent – i.e., information which cannot be acquired by the 
agent through purely deliberative means, such as simply drawing inferences from her existing information base. 
3 
 
Yet, sorting out what these responsibilities ought to be raises numerous difficulties which do not 
confront accounts of full idealization. 
I begin in §2 by briefly discussing Gerald Gaus’ recent account of moderate idealization, 
which exemplifies the sort of account that is vulnerable to the problem of information acquisition 
responsibilities that I raise here. While I do not have the space here to sufficiently argue that full 
idealization should be rejected in favor of moderate idealization (though I believe that to be the 
case), I will provide a brief explanation for why one might be inclined to reject full idealization. 
In §3, I explain the problem of information acquisition responsibilities that troubles accounts of 
moderate idealization. This problem arises out of a need to clarify why some information (which 
we do not currently possess, but which we have access to) is sometimes factored into 
determinations about what reasons we can be said to have while other information (which is also 
not possessed, but still accessible) is not. As I see it, disagreements about the ascription of one or 
more reasons to an agent are often disagreements about what information should ground the 
ascription. Such disagreements indicate a need for standards regarding the information 
acquisition responsibilities of agents. Towards this end, I identify in §4 a series of considerations 
which may help to address the problem raised in §3 and I provide an initial sketch of a criterion 
which may prove helpful when attempting to determine whether a given agent has a 
responsibility to acquire some particular piece of information. I worry that reason ascriptions that 
are based on information acquisition expectations which are not captured by the criterion (and, 
hence, not legitimate reason ascriptions) may be open to charges of authoritarianism, especially 
4 
 
when such a reason ascription prompts one person to demand that another act in a way that is 
responsive to the (illegitimately) ascribed reason(s).
4
 
 
2. MODERATE IDEALIZATION 
It is crucial to clarify the distinction between having a reason and there being a reason.
5
 To say 
that P has reason R is not just to say that P acknowledges R (although that may be the case), but 
to say that R can legitimately be ascribed to P independently of whether P acknowledges R.
6
 
This of course means that any plausible account of moderate idealization must explain when it is 
proper to ascribe a reason to an individual in cases where the individual does not acknowledge 
that reason. Moreover, as will be elaborated below, advocates of moderate idealization stress that 
there may be more reasons that apply to P’s circumstances (reasons that there are) than can 
legitimately be ascribed to P. In light of the foregoing, we can distinguish between (1) reasons 
that are recognized by P; (2) reasons that may be legitimately ascribed to P (i.e., reasons that we 
can say P has); and (3) reasons that apply to P (which include reasons that may be legitimately 
ascribed to P as well as reasons that may not be legitimately ascribed to P). 
                                                     
4
 As I use the term here, to act in an ‘authoritarian’ manner is to demand that a person adhere to some principle, 
policy, or guiding belief despite the fact that the person in question does not and cannot rationally endorse whatever 
principle, policy, or guiding belief is in question. 
5
 Some deny that such a distinction exists. For example, Maria Alvarez, in Kinds of Reasons, asserts that “I take the 
claim that there is a reason for A to φ to be equivalent to the claim that A has a reason to φ” (2010, p. 22). However, 
once the distinction between full and moderate idealization is considered, it becomes apparent that the two phrases 
are not equivalent. 
6
 We of course need an account of what it means to legitimately ascribe a reason to an individual. Such an account 
will be given in Gaussian terms in §3. 
5 
 
Gerald Gaus (2011) has presented an attractive version of an account of moderate 
idealization (see also Vallier 2014). Gaus rejects the notion of full idealization on the grounds 
that if idealized P is too far removed from actual P in term of access to information and 
adeptness at reasoning, then idealized P will affirm a set of reasons that we cannot reasonably 
expect actual P to arrive at.
7
 One worry, then, for advocates of moderate idealization may be this: 
when we attribute non-reasonably-accessible reasons to an agent in an attempt to justify some 
action to them, we fail to justify that action to the affected agent. Instead, we only justify the 
action to some far-removed idealized counterpart of the affected agent – a counterpart which 
does not suffer from the cognitive limitations that frustrate the reasoning of non-idealized 
agents.
8
 At any rate, those that reject full idealization in favor of moderate idealization typically 
do so on the grounds that we cannot expect actual P to have perfect information or to reason 
                                                     
7
 As part of his argument against full rationality, Gaus argues that, contrary to popular belief, full rationality does 
not guarantee convergence between fully rational persons, nor does it guarantee determinacy regarding what any one 
individual has reason to do (2011, pp. 239-243). 
8
 It is not uncommon for theorists working in value theory and epistemology to discourage over-idealization (or at 
least full idealization). Robert Pasnau, in a discussion of ideal theory and epistemology, has said that “[i]dealized 
epistemology… does not involve abstracting away from all human cognitive limitations, but instead focuses on what 
would count as perfection for beings such as us, in a world such as ours” (2013, p. 1005). Russell Hardin has argued 
that moral theorists have failed to adequately appreciate how “fundamentally important” the fact of human cognitive 
limitations is to the construction of moral theories (1988, p. 1, 26). With respect to the notion of full idealization, 
Hardin does not mince words: “any argument that turns on perfect information, perfect calculations, and perfect 
theory is a house of cards” (1988, p. 17). Christopher Cherniak, in Minimal Rationality, argues that “the pervasively 
and tacitly assumed conception of rationality in philosophy is so idealized that it cannot apply in an interesting way 
to actual human beings” (1986, p. 5). 
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flawlessly at all times.
9
 Yet, it is still conceded that if we give no weight to what idealized P 
would affirm, then actual P is more likely to affirm reasons which he or she does not in fact 
have. To see this, consider the thesis that P’s affirming R is both necessary and sufficient for R to 
be a reason of P’s. One problem with such a thesis is that people can be mistaken about the 
reasons that they take themselves to have (perhaps due to false beliefs or faulty reasoning).
10
  For 
example, consider Bernard Williams’ famous gin/petrol case: “[t]he agent believes that this stuff 
is gin, when it is in fact petrol. He wants a gin and tonic. Has he reason, or a reason, to mix this 
stuff with tonic and drink it?” (Williams 1981, p. 102) As Williams remarks, “it is just very odd 
to say that he has a reason to drink this stuff, and natural to say that he has no reason to drink it, 
although he thinks that he has” (1981, p. 102). Ultimately, Williams does not think we should 
say that the person in question has a reason to mix the petrol with tonic and drink it.
11
 Yet, 
adopting such a position amounts to rejecting a thoroughly subjective account of reasons for 
action.
12
  If it is right to reject such a view, and hence deny that agents in these sorts of situations 
always have the reasons that they take themselves to have, then at least some idealization is 
warranted when talking about what reasons a person can be said to have.
13
 The challenge for 
                                                     
9
 For an extended critique of full idealization, see chapter 5 of Vallier 2014. 
10
 As Gaus frames it, “if people have crazy beliefs, they do not have reasons to act as the crazy beliefs indicate, 
though they may take themselves to have such reasons” (2011, p. 236). 
11
 While the false belief might help explain the action, it would not justify it. 
12
 Or what Gaus refers to as “a purely subjective understanding of one’s reasons…” (2011, p. 236, emphasis added) 
13
 Even if one does not share Williams’ intuition regarding the gin/petrol case, the need for some idealization is 
motivated by the idea that there are at least some situations in which agents are mistaken (sometimes deeply) about 
the reasons they think they have. 
7 
 
Gaus and other advocates of moderate idealization, then, is to show how P can be idealized 
without being fully idealized. 
 In determining how much idealization of an agent is called for, Gaus starts with actual 
agents who exhibit “real rationality,” and then seeks to specify what an idealized version of those 
agents would look like without losing sight of the human cognitive limitations which actual 
agents possess.
14
 According to Gaus, “[a] rational agent is one who is competent at following a 
set of norms about how to go about reasoning…” (2011, pp. 244-245). That is, rational persons 
are capable of adhering to the rules of good reasoning.
15
 On this account, a good reason for P 
will be any reason that P arrives at by adhering to the rules of good reasoning. But it does not 
follow that a good reason, R, counts as a sufficient reason. For R to be sufficient (justified) it 
must (1) be arrived at by adhering to the rules of good reasoning; and (2) not be defeated by a 
roughly “equally accessible” reason (Gaus 2011, p. 246).  
 But how much reasoning is enough? In particular, if R1 is a good reason, how much more 
reasoning can I be expected to do – in search of a defeater – before R1 will count as sufficient?  
As Gaus puts it, P has “a sufficient reason R if and only if a ‘respectable amount’ of good 
reasoning by [P] would conclude that R is an undefeated reason (to act or believe)” (2011, p. 
                                                     
14
 For more on the notion of “real rationality,” see Pollock (2006, pp. 3-6). With regard to the notion of human 
cognitive limitations, Pollock notes that “[h]uman beings, and any real cognitive agents, are subject to cognitive 
resource constraints. They have limited reasoning power, in the form of limited computational capacity and limited 
computational speed. This makes it impossible, for example, for them to survey all of the logical consequences of 
their beliefs, or to compare infinitely many alternatives. This is a fundamental computational fact about real agents 
in the real world…” (2006, p. 3) For a more elaborate discussion of some of these limitations, see chapters two and 
three of Cherniak (1986) and Simon (1976). 
15
 Gaus takes these rules to be universal, though he does remark that they may be more easily retrieved via some 
languages rather than others (2011, p. 244). 
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250). It is important for Gaus that actual P is capable of deliberating at the level of idealized P. 
As such, the reasons that P can be said to have will only be those reasons that are accessible to 
her. Accessibility, for Gaus, is construed in terms of the relationship between P and idealized P. 
Specifically, P can be said to have a reason – that is, P can be legitimately ascribed a reason – if 
and only if (moderately) idealized P would affirm that reason to actual P.  
 One feature of Gaus’ view that some may find troubling is that it will entail an inherent 
level of vagueness with respect to what counts as a respectable amount of deliberation. As Gaus 
admits, determinations about whether this standard is met in particular instances will be “often 
vague and always contextual” (2011, p. 254).16 I do not take this feature to be a weakness of 
Gaus’ theory,17 for non-arbitrary determinations about what counts as the right amount of 
deliberation – i.e., the precise point at which one has deliberated adequately – may not be 
possible in the absence of full idealization. If this is right, and if there is a convincing case for 
rejecting full idealization, then the vagueness inherent in accounts of moderate idealization (at 
least with respect to the element of deliberation expectations) appears to be unavoidable. That 
said, Gaus’ method of addressing the issue of deliberation (i.e., the rationality component) brings 
to life a new problem when the issue of information acquisition expectations is brought into the 
discussion. This is the problem that I will discuss next. 
 
 
                                                     
16
 Pollock has argued that since reasoning is generally non-terminating (i.e., “[t]here will never be a point at which 
the agent has completed all the reasoning that could possibly be relevant to a decision”) the most we can expect 
from a “real agent” is that “the agent perform a ‘respectable amount’ of reasoning, and then base [his or her] choice 
on that” (2006, pp. 4-5). 
17
 So long as the norms of good reasoning can be determined (an issue I will not take up here). 
9 
 
3. EXPECTATIONS AND INFORMATION ACQUISITION 
When Gaus discusses how P should be idealized, he focuses on adeptness at reasoning. Yet, 
whenever he discusses a change in an agent’s moral judgment, what fundamentally drives that 
change is not more reasoning, but rather the acquisition of more information. This is precisely 
what happens in Gaus’ variation on J.S. Mill’s bridge case. Gaus imagines a person who  
does not have a reason to cross the bridge [which appears unsafe]… If, 
however, he was a civil engineer and had just concluded a study showing 
the bridge was much safer than it seemed, we will retract our claim. 
Although there is a sound deliberative route to the conclusion not to cross, 
there is a more warranted conclusion to cross of which we are now aware. 
(2011, p. 252). 
What grounds the change in the reasons the agent has is the acquisition of new 
information – in the form of facts about the bridge. This is not to deny the role of deliberation. 
An engineer certainly has to be able to draw accurate conclusions from the available data. 
However, as I will argue shortly, it is important that we carefully distinguish between the 
elements of deliberation and information acquisition when engaging in the practice of 
idealization. 
The issue is that some reasons may be accessible simply in virtue of engaging in more 
deliberation, while other reasons may be accessible in virtue of receipt of new information 
(which likely also entails additional reasoning). It is not until late in Gaus’ discussion of reasons 
that we get a more explicit glimpse of the role of information with regard to meeting the standard 
of a respectable amount of deliberation. 
10 
 
The reasons you have must be accessible to you, and as a real rational agent 
in a world in which cognitive activity has significant costs, rationality does 
not demand one keep on with the quest to discover less and less accessible 
reasons. I have stressed that this is by no means a debilitating limit on the 
reasons we can acknowledge, and indeed in many ways we move 
surprisingly close to a highly idealized rationality, for expert advice and the 
growth of social knowledge allows increasingly sophisticated and complex 
conclusions to be accessible as reasons to all with simply an adequate 
amount of deliberation. Think about all the reasons to believe and act that 
one has after twenty minutes on WebMD (2011, p. 253). 
 While Gaus appears more concerned with the act of deliberation, it is evident that what 
feeds that deliberation is the acquisition of new information. Additionally, in light of Gaus’ 
discussion of the bridge case, we see that P can be said to have a reason if, when engaging “in a 
reasonable amount of rational deliberation with the available information,” he or she would 
arrive at that reason (Gaus 2011, p. 250). This brings us to the crux of the issue: what 
information is to count as available? More important, what information is moderately idealized P 
expected to take into account? Unfortunately, Gaus does not clarify what information an agent is 
expected to take into account in searching for reasons to act or believe.
18
  
                                                     
18
 In Justificatory Liberalism, Gaus advocates for a modest form of open justification in which “we treat [one’s 
system of beliefs and reasons] as open to new information and arguments and, from this external perspective, make 
judgments about what would then be justified in [that system of beliefs and reasons]… The core idea of open 
justification is that, at any given time, a justified belief system is, ideally, stable in the face of acute and sustained 
criticism by others and of new information” (1996, p. 31). Achieving stability in one’s belief system means coming 
to terms (probably slowly) with the reasons that there are. But P non-judgmentally informing Q of information α, 
11 
 
We can conjure up numerous scenarios in which P would have a reason to Φ if only she 
had more information – e.g., if she knew the actual time, or knew the current circumstances her 
father was in, or simply read from some book sitting beside her, or looked at the current weather 
report, or finally got around to that unread mail. These are the sorts of situations in which people 
are inclined to ascribe a reason to P even if P merely has access to some information which 
might have led P to recognize that reason.
19
 But why might one be inclined to ascribe a reason to 
P in such situations (despite P merely having access to that reason), but not, for example, in a 
case where access to a reason requires more time and energy on the part of P – such as P needing 
to attend some recent public lecture on estate planning, or to be well-versed in electromagnetic 
theory, in order to have reason R? 
 The point is that, in deciding what reasons a person can be said to have, people often 
import expectations about what information the person in question has a responsibility to 
investigate. The challenge is to explain why some information (which we do not currently 
possess, but which is accessible) should be factored into determinations about what reasons a 
person can be said to have while other information (which is also not possessed, but still 
accessible) should not. It is not enough to say that idealized P should take into account any 
                                                                                                                                                                           
which will help to stabilize Q’s system of beliefs, is a distinct matter from P demanding Q to act in a particular way 
– or judging Q to have acted wrongly – because P believes that Q ought to have taken α into account. It is the latter 
issue that I am most concerned with. That said, an agent’s system of beliefs and reasons may generate certain 
information acquisition responsibilities that would indeed be captured by Gaus’ account of open justification. But, as 
will hopefully become clear below, not all information acquisition responsibilities can be generated by one’s own 
system of beliefs and reasons. Some information acquisition responsibilities are foundational – they are meant to 
help form one’s system of beliefs and reasons. If this is right, the system itself cannot fully set one’s information 
acquisition responsibilities.  
19
 The idea here is that the reason itself was accessible in virtue of the necessary information being accessible. 
12 
 
information which he or she has access to. In the current technological age, most of us have 
access to far more information than we can possibly process. Just consider all of the information 
available to a person who has internet access (whether at home, work, school, or a public 
library). It is vastly more information than that which was available to the average person just a 
few decades ago. As such, the view at hand would move us towards an account of full 
idealization. So, the issue of what information should factor into any given reason ascription is 
not simply a matter of distinguishing between information which is accessible and that which is 
inaccessible. 
With regard to information acquisition expectations (as opposed to deliberation 
expectations), it is unsatisfactory to say that one must take into account a “respectable amount” 
of information. For one thing, the issue is not so much about how much information we take into 
account, but what information we take into account. If someone says I have a reason to Φ based 
on the content of my unchecked voicemail, then it will not suffice to tell them that the fact that I 
have spent six hours on Wikipedia and did not find a reason to Φ constitutes a justification for 
my not Φ-ing (despite the fact that I took into account a lot of information during those six 
hours). When we talk about what information as opposed to how much information is to be taken 
into account, we leave little room for the notion of vagueness. If a precise piece of information 
should be factored into a reason ascription, then we can point directly to that piece of 
information and, hence, remove the vagueness that features inherently in the issue of deliberation 
expectations.
20
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 With regard to the issue of deliberation, it is unclear to what extent it might be possible to point to particular 
reasoning processes in the same way that we might point to a particular piece of information. In some situations, we 
might be able to assert “If only P had completed inference I, then P would have recognized reason R.” It is difficult, 
however, to know how widespread such assertions might be. Moreover, it is unclear exactly what sorts of inferences 
13 
 
Disagreements about the ascription of one or more reasons to an agent are often 
disagreements about what information should ground the ascription and not how much 
information is being considered. This is why the elements of deliberation and information 
acquisition need to be treated separately in any moderately-idealized account of how we come to 
have reasons. Our standard of what counts as a reasonable in terms of information acquisition 
cannot be subsumed under our standard of what counts as a reasonable amount of deliberation. 
As such, an explanation is needed for why some information (which we do not currently possess, 
but which we have access to) should be factored into determinations about what reasons a person 
can be said to have while other information (which is also not possessed, but still accessible) is 
not. This is the part of the story that we do not get from Gaus. But it is a part that we need given 
the emphasis he places on ensuring that idealized P is not too far removed from actual P in terms 
of adeptness at reasoning and information-processing capacities. 
As I have noted, one feature of accounts of moderate idealization is that they entail 
vagueness with respect to determinations about what counts as an adequate amount of 
deliberation. This vagueness appears to be unavoidable (and acceptable) insofar as a non-
arbitrary determination about what counts as the right amount of deliberation is impossible.
21
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
we might be able to expect others to make. As Cherniak argues, very little of any particular ordering of deductive 
inferences from “easy” to “difficult” “can be shown a priori to apply to all agents” (1986, p. 31). Considerations like 
this suggest that the most imposing obstacle to eliminating the vagueness issue from the deliberation component is 
developing a set of standards (along the lines of those offered below in §4.6 with respect to the information 
component) by which a third party might be able to non-arbitrarily assess moderately idealized P’s reasoning in a 
particular situation. 
21
 This is not to argue that non-arbitrary determinations about what counts as the right amount of deliberation are in 
principle impossible. It is only to recognize the challenges that confront such a view. Importantly, if it is possible to 
14 
 
However, such vagueness is clearly problematic with regard to the issue of information 
acquisition expectations. What possibilities, then, are there for dealing with this problem? That is 
the question I take up in §4. 
 
4. ON THE PRACTICE OF IDEALIZATION 
It is often not clear what idealization entails. It may entail good reasoning skills, knowledge of 
relevant facts, a requirement of impartiality, the ability to recognize and eliminate neurotic or 
poorly-generated urges and desires, the ability to identify the various moral considerations that 
pertain to a particular circumstance, and perhaps others. While it is not within the scope of this 
paper to question the legitimacy of the general practice of idealization, I do intend to discuss one 
common aspect of the practice – the inclusion of a requirement of knowledge of relevant facts. 
Such a requirement demarcates a domain of responsibility with respect to information 
acquisition. 
 It may be thought that one way to avoid full idealization, with respect to the issue of 
information acquisition, is to emphasize that agents are only expected to take into account 
relevant information. What makes a piece of information relevant to one’s pending decision is 
debatable, but as a first gloss we might say that information α is relevant to pending decision D 
just in case α is necessary to discover the reasons there are that would impact D. For example, 
with regard to Gaus’ bridge case, P should not have to acquire information about, say, effective 
                                                                                                                                                                           
remove the vagueness that I take to be inherent in the deliberation component, this does not undermine my claim 
that the elements of deliberation and information acquisition need to be treated separately in developing an account 
of moderate idealization. After all, the standards by which we would judge whether a person has deliberated 
responsibly will diverge from the standards by which we would judge whether he or she has acquired information in 
a responsible manner. 
15 
 
goat herding practices in order to decide if she has a reason to cross the bridge. Such information 
is irrelevant to her pending decision. As such, this qualification prevents the idealization theorist 
from construing idealized agents as having an exhaustive information set – a set that is certainly 
inaccessible to non-idealized agents. Nevertheless, one still over-idealizes when idealized agents 
are construed as possessing knowledge of all relevant facts. This is because we cannot always 
reasonably require an agent to consider all of the relevant facts. It is often the case that some 
relevant facts will be inaccessible to P (or, more properly, reasonably inaccessible). If, in Gaus’ 
bridge case, P needed to be a civil engineer in order to possess all of the relevant facts, then those 
facts are reasonably inaccessible to P. Admittedly, it remains true that such facts are not in 
principle inaccessible to P. After all, P could enroll in a university, obtain a civil engineering 
degree, and then return to the bridge to decide if she has a reason to cross.
22
 Most people, I 
assume, would agree that this is too much to ask of P. In light of these considerations, we should 
say that a condition of thinking that P has a responsibility to acquire some piece of information α 
is that α be both relevant and reasonably accessible.  
 I do not mean to imply that P should always – in actuality – achieve perfect synchronicity 
with idealized P’s set of recognized reasons. I would still expect P to often fall short of idealized 
P in terms of the reasons that are recognized. But where P falls short, the reasons that she fails to 
                                                     
22
 One commentator on this paper has suggested that I have gone too far in considering a case in which P might be 
expected to obtain a civil engineering degree since P could simply hire a civil engineer in order to obtain all of the 
relevant facts. This comment illustrates the very issue at hand: why think it is reasonable to expect that P hire a civil 
engineer in order to retrieve all of the relevant facts? While I do not dispute that doing so would likely be more cost 
and time efficient for P, I rely on the hypothetical situation (as indicated by the use of a conditional), in which a 
degree would be necessary to obtain the relevant facts, in order to demonstrate how some relevant facts might be 
considered reasonably inaccessible.  
16 
 
recognize should be – if they are to be legitimately ascribable to her – derivable from 
information that is relevant to the deliberative situation at hand and also reasonably accessible to 
her (in conjunction with a reasonable amount of deliberation).
23
 With regard to Gaus’ bridge 
case, P should not have to acquire information about effective goat herding practices or obtain a 
civil engineering degree in order for her set of recognized reasons to perfectly synchronize with 
idealized P’s. But what about cases in which P simply needs to check an outstanding voicemail, 
or look at the current weather report in order to achieve synchronicity with idealized P? These 
are the sorts of everyday cases that are troubling for the moderate idealizer. Yet, it is not clear 
how one might go about demarcating a domain of individual responsibility with respect to 
information acquisition that qualifies such information as both relevant and reasonably 
accessible. 
 In what follows I will present a series of considerations that I think shed light on the 
complexities surrounding the notion of information acquisition responsibilities. The first 
consideration focuses on one possible way of determining whether an agent has satisfied his or 
her information acquisition responsibilities. The remaining considerations are concerned more 
directly with the notions of relevancy and reasonable accessibility. I take each consideration to 
yield some insight that is helpful in developing an initial criterion for determining whether a 
given agent has a responsibility to take some particular piece of information into account. After 
discussing each of the considerations, I offer one plausible way of organizing the individual 
insights into such a criterion. 
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 This point assumes the reason under consideration cannot be arrived at through purely deliberative means alone. 
17 
 
4.1 Consideration for Effort 
One possible approach to determining whether an agent has met her information acquisition 
responsibilities relies on gauging the level of effort that she exerts in terms of information 
acquisition. Call this the effort view. In Gaus’ bridge case, we might say that P does not have a 
reason to cross – despite there being a reason to cross – if P did not arrive at a reason to cross 
and it is the case that P both engaged in a respectable amount of deliberation and put a 
reasonable amount of effort into acquiring as many of the relevant facts as possible. While this 
view entails an element of vagueness, the vagueness applies not to how much information is 
taken into account, but to how much effort the individual has put into canvassing the relevant 
facts. This may be helpful with regards to the bridge case, but that is only because P is 
confronted with a clear question to deliberate on: is this bridge safe to cross? Because P is 
acutely aware of the deliberative situation that confronts her, we can rightly expect P to search 
out facts relevant to the bridge case.
24
 If P had spent two hours researching South American 
banana farming practices, we could legitimately claim that P had not put in a reasonable amount 
of effort into discovering the relevant facts (for P’s efforts were misdirected). But many of the 
cases which challenge the moderate idealizer do not fit this picture. For example, it might be the 
case that P would have a reason to go to the hospital if only she listened to the unchecked 
voicemail left by her father. The issue here is that P is not directly confronted by the question of 
whether she needs to visit her father in the hospital. As it turns out, her father had been in great 
                                                     
24
 We are not always aware of the deliberative situations which require our attention. For example, while Vance may 
in fact have dangerously high cholesterol, it may be the case he is not aware of that fact. Yet, a deliberative situation 
exists with regard to Vance’s cholesterol problem – he needs to decide on a management plan. The point is that 
troubling cases of reason ascriptions are cases where an external party recognizes a deliberative situation in which 
the agent in question does not. 
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health recently, so P was not “on standby” with respect to her father’s health. As such, the 
standard advocate of moderate idealization appears unable to specify whether P can be said to 
have a reason to visit her father in the hospital.  
It may be the case then that we can only attribute a reason to an agent in cases where that 
agent is directly confronted with the same question (though in its first-person form) that we are 
attempting to answer (e.g., Does P have a reason to Φ?). This is to say that P is aware of the 
deliberative situation – a situation that calls for P to weigh all reasonably-discoverable reasons 
R1… Rn in order to make the most appropriate decision. Call this the direct-confrontation 
requirement. For it is when the agent in question is directly confronted with the same question 
that we are, that we can make claims about whether the agent has invested enough effort into 
discovering the relevant facts. The agent’s awareness of the question serves to focus the 
discussion on what, rather than how much, information is being investigated. This is the feature 
that is present in the bridge case, but not in the hospital case. 
While the direct-confrontation requirement is an important qualification to the effort 
view, it does not rescue the effort view from what may be its most significant problem. The 
effort view is restricted to providing an answer to the question of whether an agent has put 
enough effort into meeting her information acquisition responsibilities.  But this is not the 
precise problem that most troubles advocates of moderate idealization. The difficult cases facing 
such advocates turn on claims of the following sort: P had a responsibility to take into account 
information α. Notice, however, that the effort view cannot specify whether an agent had a 
responsibility to take into account a particular piece of information. For this view is not 
concerned with particular bits of information, but only with the agent’s effort. Because of this, an 
agent may be able to satisfy the requirements of the effort view without taking into account the 
19 
 
one piece of information that turns out to be crucial. As such, the effort view is insufficient, even 
when it incorporates the direct-confrontation requirement that serves to focus the agent’s effort.25 
What the shortcoming of the effort view teaches us is that we need an account of 
information acquisition responsibility that can tell us whether an agent has a responsibility to 
take into account a particular piece of information. If the account can tell us that, then it will 
have the resources to also tell us whether the agent has met his or her information acquisition 
responsibilities with respect to a particular deliberative situation. In light of this, the remaining 
considerations will focus on various instances in which an agent appears to have a responsibility 
to obtain certain pieces of information. 
 
4.2 Consideration for Societal Standards 
One possible way of arguing that an agent has a responsibility to obtain information α is to argue 
that α qualifies as having a sui generis status in the society or local community. For example, it 
is commonly thought that agents (qua citizens) are responsible for having a grasp of any well-
publicized societal standards, including legal and social rules in addition to other well-publicized 
societal or communal standards.
26
 A standard which does not qualify as a legal or social rule is 
one which is neither a formal law nor a part of the social morality, but still considered necessary 
to achieve a basic level of “societal literacy.” As I construe it, societal literacy entails a basic 
                                                     
25
 The effort view cannot be salvaged by arguing that one has put in enough effort only if one has discovered all of 
the relevant and reasonably accessible facts. Such an account just leaves us where we are now – trying to clarify the 
notions of relevancy and reasonable accessibility. 
26
 To my knowledge, not much has been said about what grounds the validity of expectations regarding the 
acquisition of knowledge of certain epistemic norms. I suspect, however, that such grounds may at least be found in 
some social contract accounts. Nevertheless, this is not something I take up in this paper. 
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understanding of (1) how the society is formally structured; (2) how members of the society are 
expected to conduct themselves; and (3) the most common skills of survival and risk aversion 
within the society. With regard to (3), I have in mind a range of skills that runs (very roughly) 
from being able to buy food and write a check to being able to file one’s taxes, purchase a home, 
and avoid common scams.
27
  
Many of the skills that fall under (3) will entail a heightened commitment to information 
acquisition. For instance, it is standard in communities across the U.S. to hire a licensed 
inspector prior to finalizing the purchase of a home. Any person who buys a home prior to 
having the home properly inspected is usually thought to have not performed his or her due 
diligence. For example, imagine Susan who is trying to decide between buying house A or house 
B. After weighing all the pros and cons of each house, Susan finds that she does not have a 
decisive preference for one house over the other. If only there were a good reason to prefer one 
house over the other her decision would be much easier, but as far as she knows such a reason 
does not exist. So, Susan flips a coin to decide and ends up buying house A. It turns out that 
there was a very good reason not to buy house A – it has a mold problem which would have been 
easily discovered by a licensed inspector. In such a case, Susan has failed to investigate 
responsibly, at least according to well-publicized home-buying standards in the U.S.  
Alternatively, imagine that Susan did hire an inspector, but instead of having a mold 
problem, house A suffers from a leaking water line running to the house. The line leaks after 
                                                     
27
 I acknowledge that there is plenty of room for debate about which exact skills would be required for one to 
achieve societal literacy. As one reviewer has noted, familiarity with home buying standards might extend beyond 
what we would consider to be the most common skills of survival and risk aversion in our society (since, for 
example, not every person will be so situated (e.g., economically) that such information is needed). It is perhaps the 
case then that this set of skills will be even smaller than I have anticipated. 
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being corroded by harsh chemicals that entered the ground after a nearby laundry endured a 
chemical spill years ago. While a licensed inspector probably would not have discovered the 
problem, Susan would have known to further investigate the issue if she (1) had purchased an 
Environmental Data Resource (EDR) report in order to learn of the spill; and (2) surveyed 
members of the community to see how they were affected by the spill. According to well-
publicized home buying standards in the U.S., Susan could have performed her due diligence and 
still not discovered the faulty water line. This is because obtaining EDR reports is not necessary 
to performing one’s due diligence with respect to home buying. Thus, in the first case, but not 
the second, Susan had certain information acquisition responsibilities, grounded in community 
standards, which were not met. Consequently, we could legitimately ascribe a reason to Susan to 
not buy house A in the first case, but not the second. 
Consideration for societal standards need not be limited to the standards of the broader 
social-political society. We may include here the standards of specialist communities. Cases 
involving specialist knowledge show us that our expectations about the reasons which an agent 
has a responsibility to discover are affected by certain considerations about the agent’s particular 
background. If P is a civil engineer and is trying to decide whether a bridge is safe to cross for 
the general public, we may expect P to take account of certain facts that we would not expect a 
typical agent to take account of. That is, beyond that information which is given a sui generis 
status by the broader society, P may be expected to take into account additional information in 
virtue of his or her specialized background or unique circumstances.  
Holly Smith begins her paper “Culpable Ignorance” with a polarizing case that deals with 
this very issue. The case is presented in light of philosophers who distinguish “between the 
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objective wrongness of an action and the agent’s blameworthiness” (Smith 1983, p. 543). Smith 
continues to summarize the position: 
No matter how terrible the act may be from an objective point of view, the 
agent is not blameworthy if he had an excuse for what he did. Thus a doctor 
who treated a premature infant’s respiratory distress in 1954 by exposing 
her to unnecessarily high concentrations of oxygen, and so caused severe 
eye damage, did something terrible. But if the doctor did not realize that 
oxygen enrichment would have this effect, he is not to blame for the baby’s 
blindness. Ignorance of the nature of one’s act is the pre-eminent example 
of an excuse that forestalls blame. However, there are occasions when a 
person’s ignorance is itself criticizable – when he should have realized what 
he was doing. Perhaps the doctor should have known that high oxygen 
enrichment would induce blindness: the latest issue of his medical journal 
described a study establishing this effect and recommending the use of 
lower concentrations as equally effective for respiratory problems. The 
doctor should have read his journal, and if he had done so, would have 
realized he ought to use less oxygen. In cases such as these, opinion is 
sharply divided: many people feel that such an agent must be blamed for 
using excessive oxygen, while others insist that his ignorance, however 
criticizable in itself, nonetheless excuses him (1983, p. 543). 
 Though Smith does not frame the case in such terms, the divisive responses that she 
envisions to the case will arguably be fixed by expectations about what information the doctor 
had a responsibility to take into account. According to Smith, the case is one of deficient 
23 
 
investigation: the doctor “cannot be excused for his act because he should have realized what he 
was doing” (1983, p. 544). But this is only to say that the doctor had a reason to use a lower 
concentration of oxygen. If he had no such reason, then the claim that he cannot be excused is 
ungrounded. The reason would have been discovered if only the doctor would have fulfilled 
what are presumed to be his information acquisition responsibilities. This is apparent in Smith’s 
claim that “he ought to have read [the journal], and if he had, he would have discovered the use 
of high oxygen concentrations to be unnecessarily harmful to the infant” (1983, p. 544).  
But Smith does not consider whether there are legitimate grounds for the claim that the 
doctor ought to have read his journal. It is assumed that he “could have acquired the requisite 
information, ought to have done so, but failed to fulfill this obligation” (Smith 1983, p. 547). As 
such, Smith does not engage the issue of information acquisition responsibilities which lurks in 
the background of her paper.
28
 Once the issue is raised, however, one might ask: is this a journal 
that the American Medical Association expects all doctors to read? If the answer is yes, then 
standards particular to the doctor’s circumstances (that of being a licensed physician) may dictate 
that he had a responsibility to take such information into account.  
 
4.3 Consideration for Generally-Reliable Sources 
There are cases in which the agent in question may not have any grounds for thinking that the 
mechanism by which information α is acquired is a mechanism which he or she should 
investigate. Returning to the case of Susan’s pending home purchase: suppose that she has never 
heard of the EDR report and has no idea that such a report could be useful in deciding between 
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 Smith does consider a case in which the doctor’s nurse fails to inform him that the journal had arrived (see 1983, 
p. 548). On account of this, the doctor’s failure to read the journal is presumably excused. This, however, still 
assumes that the doctor had a standing obligation to read the journal. 
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the two houses. This fact, in combination with the fact that obtaining EDR reports is not 
necessary to meet home-buying standards in the U.S., leads us to believe that Susan did not fail 
to meet her information acquisition responsibilities. But one’s evaluation of Susan’s situation 
may change if it were the case that the home inspector advised Susan to obtain the EDR report 
given that a recent home buyer in the area encountered the same problem. The inspection report, 
he might have said, would inform Susan whether or not house A falls inside the area affected by 
the chemical spill. So, societal standards alone may not be enough to ground one’s full 
information acquisition responsibilities.  Generally-reliable sources – such as a licensed home 
inspector advising a potential home buyer – may provide an agent with information that further 
expands one’s information acquisition responsibilities. In the case at hand, Susan now knows 
that there is a method of information acquisition (the EDR report) that is relevant to her pending 
home purchase. 
 
4.4 Consideration for Special Commitments 
In cases where an agent has agreed to some special commitment, such a commitment may entail 
additional information acquisition responsibilities. For example, if Joey and his wife have agreed 
that Joey will be responsible for managing the family finances, then Joey has a responsibility to 
know the days of the month in which the family’s bills are due. Such a responsibility comes in 
virtue of one’s formal and informal contracts.  
Importantly, one’s special commitments may entail information acquisition 
responsibilities that help to inform deliberative situations that are related to one’s special 
commitments. For example, Joey’s responsibility to know the days of the month in which the 
family’s bills are due will certainly inform the following deliberative situation: Does Joey have a 
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reason to pay the phone bill this month? In such a case, we need not worry about whether Joey is 
directly confronted with the deliberative situation at hand before providing an affirmative answer 
to this question. His agreement to manage the family finances requires a commitment to an on-
going awareness of this particular deliberative situation.  
It is also possible that there may be cases in which one’s special commitments entail a 
responsibility to acquire some information α which will prove useful in a deliberative situation 
that is not directly related to one’s special commitments. For example, there may be some 
(fanciful) case involving Joey in which knowledge of when his family’s phone bill is due would 
be relevant to a deliberative situation that is not directly related to his special commitment to 
manage the family finances.  
 
4.5 Consideration for Significant Costs 
One might think that when a decision under consideration is of exceptional significance, and the 
agent has adequate time to conduct a highly-thorough investigation, that obtaining information α 
is reasonably expected, even if the acquisition of α would not be required in light of the previous 
considerations. The sort of cases that I envision here are ones in which the agent encounters a 
deliberative situation of atypical significance – e.g., involving a significant amount of risk or 
carrying a heavy penalty for a poorly-chosen course of action. Whether to invest one’s entire 
life-savings into an unproven investment vehicle or whether to opt for a risky treatment in an 
effort to cure a not-well-understood medical condition are examples of deliberative situations of 
atypical significance. 
29
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 It is unclear just how common these sorts of cases might be. After all, with regard to some particular (hard) case c, 
while a community may not prescribe any standards for how to deliberate about c in particular, it may prescribe 
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4.6 Summary 
I have discussed some considerations regarding how one might go about responding to the 
everyday cases that accounts of moderate idealization are challenged by. I believe that these 
considerations help to demonstrate that our expectations about what reasons an agent can be said 
to have are significantly influenced by our expectations about what information acquisition 
responsibilities that agent can be said to have. Clarifying exactly what those responsibilities are 
is the challenge that confronts us. As I hope to have shown, incorporating an account of 
information acquisition responsibility into an account of the reasons one can be said to have 
raises difficulties. This is especially true of cases where one person demands that another adhere 
to some moral imperative Φ. For instance, imagine P who had access to a public lecture which, if 
attended, would have given P a reason R to act according to some moral imperative Φ (in virtue 
of the acquisition of new information). In the case of Q, who demands that P act according to Φ, 
what does Q’s demand entail? It seems that Q’s demand is grounded in the claim that P ought to 
have attended (or had a responsibility to attend) the public lecture (and, hence, ought to having 
acquired the relevant information). But why think that P had such a responsibility? Moreover, if 
P does not in fact have this responsibility, then Q’s demand is void of legitimate authority. That 
is, so long as we cannot explain why P ought to have attended the lecture in order to acquire the 
relevant information, then Q’s demand is purely authoritarian in nature (i.e., it is a demand that 
persists despite not being legitimate). This is the concern that motivates the need to clarify the 
idea of information acquisition responsibility. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
standards which advise a general set of cases of which c is a member. If so, expectations about the agent’s 
deliberation on c may be captured (at least partially) by considerations for community standards.  
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 Perhaps a criterion for determining whether a given agent has a responsibility to take 
some particular piece of information into account will help to summarize the discussion up to 
this point. Given the claim that P has a responsibility to take into account information α if and 
only if α is relevant and reasonably accessible to P, something like the following criterion may 
help to express the notions of relevancy and reasonable accessibility: information α is relevant 
and reasonably accessible to P (i.e., P is responsible for acquiring α) if and only if (1) A obtains; 
and (2) at least one of B-E obtains. 
(A) P is aware of deliberative situation S – a situation that calls for P to 
recognize α as part of weighing all reasonably-discoverable reasons 
R1… Rn in order to make the most appropriate decision. 
(B) α is considered to have a sui generis status by the society or specialist 
community of which P is a recognized member and α would lead P to 
discover
30
 one or more reasons crucial to S. (This may include legal as 
well as social rules in addition to other well-publicized community 
standards.) 
(C) P has learned through generally-reliable means31 that method M will 
lead to α which is relevant to S and, were P to discover α, P would 
discover one or more reasons relevant to S.  
(D) P has agreed to Φ and Φ-ing entails a commitment to acquire α which, 
when taken into account, would lead P to discover one or more reasons 
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 Requiring no more than a reasonable level of deliberation. 
31
 The generally-reliable means may be partially determined by the community standards. 
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relevant to S (where S may or may not be directly related to the act of 
Φ-ing).  
(E) S is of such exceptional significance – and the agent has adequate time 
to conduct a highly-thorough investigation – that obtaining α is 
reasonably expected, even if the acquisition of α would not be required 
on the grounds specified in (B) – (D). 
This criterion is intended only to incorporate what I take to be some of the less 
controversial expectations regarding the information acquisition responsibilities of typical 
agents. It construes an agent’s information acquisition responsibilities in terms of information 
that is relevant and reasonably accessible to the agent. I do not claim this criterion to be 
exhaustive; nor is it without difficulties. With regard to potential problems, one might expect for 
disagreement to arise at a number of points. For instance, people might disagree about whether a 
particular piece of information should be considered a part of societal literacy. Or they might 
disagree about whether a particular source of information should be considered generally 
reliable. Or they might disagree about whether a particular piece of information should be 
required by one’s special commitments.  
While each of these issues raises their own considerations, they do not undermine the 
usefulness of a criterion for determining whether a given agent has a responsibility to take some 
particular piece of information into account. Such a criterion will still reduce the domain of 
borderline cases by honing in on what information can legitimately be expected to be taken into 
account by a typical agent. This is important since determining the information acquisition 
responsibilities of an agent is a crucial part of any legitimate reason ascription to that agent – 
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insofar as an ascription of reason R to P is justified only if P has a responsibility to acquire that 
information which is necessary in order to recognize R. 
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
I have primarily been concerned with trying to articulate the troubles that surround the idea that 
P can be ascribed a reason to Φ just as long as if only P were to take into account some relevant 
piece of information (that P has access to), then P would recognize for herself that she has a 
reason to Φ. While such an idea may seem innocuous at first pass, I have argued that it assumes 
an account of responsibility with respect to information acquisition that is easily overlooked. But 
without a proper grounding, expectations about information acquisition responsibilities can lead 
to illegitimate reason ascriptions.  
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